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The case study under examination focuses on the international strategic alliance celebrated by 
Brisa – Auto-Estradas de Portugal, (hereinafter referred to as “Brisa”), the largest transport 
infrastructure company in Portugal, in Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias, (hereinafter 
referred to as “CCR”), a Brazilian consortium, which has become one of the largest 
infrastructure concession companies in the world. 
 
The aim of this research revolves around value creation in international strategic alliances. This 
thesis strives to identify the streams of added-value in cross-border partnerships and at which 
point of time each form of value is created. 
 
The results that have surfaced from this research attest that firms may create value, strategic, 
learning and financial, from strategic alliances, and that those benefits are captured by 
organizations. 
 
Moreover, this study shows that the distinct drivers of value are firstly originated at different 
stages of the operation. However, the different components act as enablers to the overall value 
chain potential of the venture. 
 
The final finding is that, to some extent, the value created in an international endeavor is limited 
to the operation, having restricted impact in the competitive positioning of the firm in its 
domestic market.  
 
There is hope that the conclusions drawn from this research constitute a valuable contribution 
to existing theory on the topic, as well as to any firm in its internationalization growth strategies. 
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“No company can go it alone. (…) More than ever, many of the skills and resources 
essential to a company’s future prosperity lie outside the firm’s boundaries, and outside 
management’s direct control. In this new world of networks, coalitions, and alliances, 
strategic partnerships are not an option but a necessity”. 
(Source: Alliance Advantage – The Art of Creating Value through Partnering, Doz 
and Hamel, 1998, Harvard Business Press) 
 
Strategic alliances1 are a frequent response to several current challenges faced by firms. The 
need for collaboration arises as a means for organizations to achieve a stronger market position, 
through the increase in the overall performance of organizations, a shared risk management 
strategy and grasping new resources and capabilities 2 . Additionally, some alliances are 
established between entities from two different countries. In those cases, this is sometimes a 
way for one of the partners to internationalize. Strategic alliances contribute also to the value 
creation of the firm (Chan et al., 1997). However, the process of value creation through 
partnerships needs further investigation.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the value created in international strategic alliances. 
More precisely, what are the different forms of value that arise during a partnership, how to 
properly evaluate them and at what stage of the operation is value being created. 
 
This research is not focused on the operational aspect of the value creation process in strategic 
alliances. As previously mentioned, the aim is to assess the different value streams that are 
created in international partnerships and how value is measured and evaluated.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Doz and Hamel (1998) employ the concepts of strategic alliances, partnerships and coalitions as synonyms. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper, the mentioned definitions are considered as similar. 
2 The Association of Strategic Alliances Professionals, 2015; “Alliance Management: a Strategic Discipline” 
available [online] at: 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.strategic-alliances.org/resource/dynamic/blogs/20140604_150316_23673.pdf 
[accessed on 14 May 2015] 
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A distinction between strategic, learning and financial value was made. The first one refers to 
the overall competitive positioning of a firm, through the access of new resources, developing 
competitive advantages, thus improving general performance for organizations. Learning value 
relates to the new sets of capabilities that were improved after a strategic alliance and that were 
a result of a learning process during the operation. The later refers to monetary benefits arising 
during the operation, i.e. above-market returns and operational efficiency.  
 
The analysis was performed through several sub-research questions developed through the 
iterative process comprising theory and data. As a methodology, the case study enables a deep 
understanding of the research topic. The study was focused on the international alliance 
established by Brisa in CCR.  
 
Firstly, the literature review comprises two main topics, namely strategic alliances and value 
creation process. The concept of strategic alliance is appraised, identifying main definitions and 
features, as well as its international component. The second chapter covers the definitions of 
value and value creation, as well as the distinct components in the value chain of a strategic 
alliance, i.e. strategic, learning and financial value. Two distinctive theories on partnerships are 
also introduced in this section. 
 
In the second chapter, the research methodology is clarified, having relied on an exploratory 
case study, where the research questions were designed as research evolved. The several 
sources of data collected and analyzed are properly identified in this chapter. 
 
Thirdly, a section is dedicated to the case study report of the international strategic alliance of 
Brisa in CCR. The first sub-sections are devoted to describe the context in which this operation 
arose, specifically information regarding the two involved corporations and the macro-
economic framework of Portugal and Brazil. Successively, the several stages of the 
international operation are reviewed, from a chronological perspective. 
 
The analysis was carried out through several sub-research questions, which highlight the 
distinct components of the value creation process, the incorporation of these benefits into the 
organization and, lastly, the impact of timing in the value chain. 
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Lastly, one chapter covers the main conclusions drawn from the case study, introducing, as 
well, research limitations of the paper and future research on the topic of value creation in 
international strategic alliances. 
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2. STRATEGIC ALLIANCES  
“The greatest change in corporate structure – and in the way business is conducted – 
may be the accelerating growth of relationships based not on ownership but on partnership… 
semi-formal alliances of all sorts”. 
(Source: Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1995, p. A10) 
 
The concept of strategic alliances has been the object of study in the last decades on behalf of 
several researchers. Part of the conclusions have actually considered that the extreme booming 
in partnerships, in the last decades, has been one of the most durable and persistent drivers in 
the business context, namely in terms of organizational design and cooperative arrangements 
with other firms (Koka and Prescott, 2002).  
 
Moreover, towards the end of the last century, the business world has acknowledged the 
importance of efficiently and effectively design, manage and evaluate a strategic alliance, given 
the extensive literature developed on the subject. According to Anand and Khanna (2000), 
partnerships are perceived to be one of the most crucial organizational designs to appear in the 
1990’s and to have an impact on how firms operate.  
 
Exhibit 1 reveals the evolution of both domestic and international strategic alliances. During 
the ten years of analysis, the number of cross-borders’ partnerships went from almost 1,000 in 
1989 to close to 4,500 deals in 1999. 
 
Despite the increasingly high failure rate associated with the formation and management of 
strategic alliances, the value creation potential of partnerships is still driving and fueling the 
formation of collaborative arrangements between firms in the current days (Ireland et al., 2002).  
 
Notwithstanding, and according to Anand and Khanna (2000), firms engaging in partnerships 
are struggling with the intricate and complex process of designing and implementing a 
sustainable value-added partnership. 
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2.1. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
Over the course of decades, many authors attempted to provide an objective and worldwide-
accepted definition for the concept of strategic alliances. But as the business environment 
evolved, several adaptions would be developed and added.  
 
In this chapter, several non-conflicting 3  definitions of strategic alliances are addressed, 
comprising specific features of partnerships that are unique and particular to this specific form 
of organizational design. The explanations provided by the several authors under examination 
are complementary to one another and are able to introduce a more integrated and complete 
overview on how to successfully implement a value-added strategic alliance. 
 
Some authors define strategic partnerships as the organizational structures adopted by 
otherwise independent firms, in which partners combine and share resources, considering this 
structural form a middle ground between market transactions and structural hierarchies (Chan 
et al., 1997). The same group of researchers goes even further by claiming that partnerships 
allow firms to deploy more efforts into their specific and core competencies, while resourcing 
to the market when specific assets are missing. In addition, according to Andrew C. Inkpen 
(2009), the independence feature of partner firms constitutes one of the main characteristics of 
strategic alliances, provided they will remain autonomous following the partnership. 
 
The last mentioned author defines strategic alliances as agreements of a collaborative nature, 
through which two or more firms come together in a shared process of resources and/or 
governance structures.  
 
                                                 
3 During this research process, there was no evidence of contradictory definitions regarding strategic alliances. 
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Other researchers established strategic alliances as structures with an extremely high degree of 
complexity, in a form of an unfinished contract, mainly due to the intricacy of managing a 
coalition (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Additionally, Jensen and Meckling (1992) note that 
strategic alliances are the result of an uncertainty-filled process, in which partner corporations 
exchange know-how. The ambiguity comprised in the process arises in the costly sophistication 
required to anticipate all issues and factors affecting a strategic alliance’s design and 
management. Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty and complexity in a strategic partnership 
rises due to the lack of knowledge and information whether partner firm(s) will comply with 
their responsibilities in the agreement (Powell, 1996).  
 
The level of inter-dependence experienced by partner firms is significant, provided corporations 
may end up having a crucial impact on each other’s operations and become extremely 
vulnerable to the actions of the other firm(s) (Parkhe, 1993). According to the author, the degree 
of mutual dependence in a coalition causes complexity and an increase in the cost structure, 
namely expenses regarding the coordination and management of a partnership.  
 
In light of the above, strategic alliances may be considered an important source for firms to 
acquire and grasp new resources, learn from the managerial experience, and, consequently, to 
increase its competitive position vis-à-vis competitors (Ireland et al., 2002). More precisely, the 
ultimate goal in cooperatively pooling resources from partner firms is to sustainably rally on 
their sources of competitive advantage and to improve overall performance.  
 
Furthermore, strategic alliances allow partner firms to improve their managerial decision-
making process, provided the best-qualified players and partners will determine the courses of 
action and strategy in the partnership (Chan et al., 1997). Such argument may even go in the 
sense that such inter-organization form and inter-communication causes partnerships to 
resemble a network organization, rather than a hierarchical one (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). 
 
In conclusion, there are several relevant features of strategic alliances that dictate the guidelines 
for conducting the case study of the operation established by Brisa in CCR.  
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Despite all the mentioned characteristics are not included, significantly, in the definitions 
provided, for the purposes of the case study analysis “Strategic alliances are cooperative 
arrangements between two or more firms to improve their competitive position and 
performance by sharing resources” (Ireland et al., 2002).  
2.2. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
Is an international strategic alliance different from the concepts and features explored in the 
previous section of this paper? This question is important as international strategic alliances 
have surfaced and intensified as a natural consequence of cross-national transactions, rapidly 
evolving technology and the worldwide phenomenon of globalization (Doz and Hamel, 1998). 
According to these authors, the openness of countries’ boundaries has steered the way for firms 
to explore new opportunities, markets and solutions internationally.  
 
Nonetheless, the literature available on the concept of international partnerships between firms 
has been neglected for a substantial period of time, despite the existence of foreign strategic 
alliances for many centuries in corporate history and their growing importance in managerial 
and entrepreneurial efforts (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994).  
 
The same group of authors defines an international venture (in this specific context, and in the 
perspective of that decade’s conception, “venture” is perceived as a synonym to the notion of 
alliance) as the corporate structure that enables partner firms to enhance their competitive 
positioning by leveraging resources and outputs from the firms involved in the inter-firm 
arrangement. The sole distinction is the domestic jurisdiction in which all the involved parties 
operate in, originally.   
 
In line with such definition, and according to the research conducted by Parkhe (1991), cross-
borders’ strategic alliances may be considered as fairly lasting and collaborative inter-firm 
business arrangements, by which independent firms from two or more countries combine and 
share resources.  
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The aforementioned concept does not comprise the market-transaction and merger structures, 
as the latter does not constitute a mutual inter-dependence organizational design. The new entity 
created on a merger operation does not rely on existing firms to act as a going-concern, as it is 
the case of strategic alliances, according to Andrew C. Inkpen (2009). 
 
In light of the above, the concept of an international inter-firm arrangement does not contradict 
the literature available in the previous chapter of this dissertation paper. In that sense, the 
relevant definition and features of strategic alliances remain unaffected for the analysis. 
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3. VALUE CREATION PROCESS 
Andrew C. Inkpen (2009) defines value creation as the ultimate goal pursued by firms in 
strategic alliances, in a way that could not be achieved by operating the market “alone”. 
 
In the following sections, the concepts of value and value creation are studied, as well as the 
distinctive forms that it could assume in partnerships, i.e. strategic, learning and financial value. 
Two distinct, yet non-conflicting theories on strategic alliances are judged (Exhibit 2).  
 
The research is focused on the different forms of value arising in a strategic alliance and how 
to properly measure them. No analysis of the operational component of the value creation 
process is offered. 
3.1. CONCEPTS OF VALUE AND VALUE CREATION 
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.” 
Warren Buffet 
 
The concept of value is covered in complexity and polysemy (Chernatony et al., 2000). Exhibit 
3 reflects the multiple disciplines that have engaged efforts in attempting to describe what value 
is, namely statistics, pricing, consumer behavior and strategy. The majority of the notions 
encompass a significant degree of subjectivity and gaps between the different stakeholders. 
Definitions based on expectations, judgements and willingness give rise to multiple 
interpretations on the value concept.  
 
A transversal definition is yet to be largely accepted in business, reflecting a general confusion 
surrounding the value concept. In this sense, there is a severe fragmentation amongst scholars, 
specifically in determining what value creation is and how it occurs, as well as regarding the 
process of value capture (Lepak et al., 2007).  
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Lepak and colleagues (2007) establish that the value chain reveals a multilevel perspective, 
depending on which stakeholder the focus is on. The process of value creation and capture 
could be appraised from several perspectives, namely shareholders and internal (for instance, 
employees) and external stakeholders (customers and the society at large are a few examples) 
surrounding organizations.  
 
Despite the lack of integration in the literature available, Andrew C. Inkpen (2009) defines 
value creation in strategic alliances as the process of pooling resources and capabilities from 
partner firm(s), which comprises potential financial returns for the involved parties, as well as 
other non-monetary benefits. 
3.2. VALUE CREATION IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
“Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing”. 
Oscar Wilde 
 
Strategic, learning and financial advantages constitute, broadly, the three forms of value created 
and absorbed during a strategic alliance. Value created and captured by buyers and suppliers is 
disregarded from this literature review, as the focus is to evaluate the process of generating a 
value-added operation with partner firms, from a pure organizational perspective. 
 
As evidenced by Anand and Khanna (2000), creating value in a strategic alliance is an intricate 
process. Such depends mainly on previous experiences in partnerships’ management and 
discrepancies amongst all involved parties in their ability of creating value. However, the fact 
that strategic alliances generate monetary and non-monetary benefits is largely accepted (Chan 
et al., 1997).  
 
The following sections attest that firms are able to create and capture value through learning 
experiences, the improvement of managerial skills, the leverage of external resources and 
capabilities and competitive advantages associated with managing a strategic alliance. In 
addition, there is evidence of monetary value arising in a partnership, which can oscillate 
amongst all partner firms. 
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Timing is also a variable that should be taken into account in this process. Andrew C. Inkpen 
(2009) has determined that value is only created after the formation of the strategic alliance. In 
doing so, the author disregards any form of value (either strategic, learning or financial) created 
and captured during the preparation stage of the venture, or the possibility of value creation 
when exiting the partnership. 
 
As the two partners, in part, create value, divergence between the value perceived and captured 
by all involved firms may appear and give rise to bargaining between partners. Such could 
generate additional expenditures to the strategic alliance (Hamel, 1991). 
3.2.1. STRATEGIC VALUE AND THE RESOURCE BASED THEORY 
From an organizational perspective, Porter (1985) establishes that new sets of raw materials, 
new production methodologies, new technologies available and new corporate procedures are 
the sources for value creation, which enable firms to assert themselves against competition in 
a determined market. Accordingly, the strategic value created aims to strengthen the 
organization’s position in a specific market, through leveraging external resources and giving 
rise to competitive advantages.  
 
Value in a strategic alliance is created through the development and leverage of two core 
competitive advantages that arise within the arrangement. Makadok (2001), in line with 
previous arguments, reveals the positive effects that previous cooperative experiences add to a 
current operation’s management. As the alliance portfolio of a firm enlarges, the organization 
is better armed to extract value, to superiorly leverage resources and, lastly, to enhance 
management skills when regarding strategic alliances. The second source is related with a 
sustainable and rational combination and sharing of resources (Ireland et al., 2002). Asset 
alignment and complementary pushes in an ascending fashion the value creation potential of a 
strategic alliance.  
 
Partnerships comprise the pooling of resources from partner firms into joint activities. This 
view has its fundamentals on the potential value creation process that may arise when resources 
from partner firms are combined and leveraged (Das and Teng, 2000). 
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According to the two mentioned authors, a corporation is the result of its own set of 
heterogeneous resources and capabilities that, if developed and managed properly, may lead to 
potential competitive advantages, which in turn may allow increasing overall performance, 
boosting the competitive positioning of partner firms. 
 
In addition, this view surfaced as a consequence of how suitable and valuable resources are in 
terms of strategic alliances. Firms will most probably form a partnership when they lack specific 
resources or when there is an abundance of those assets, allowing for the firm to share them 
with potential associates (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
 
As opposed to other theories on strategic alliances, the resource-based view focuses exclusively 
on the in-house environment of firms, rather than on market factors and social networks (Das 
and Teng, 2000). The researchers still concluded that a clear and deep comprehension of the 
bundle of resources owned by all parties of the strategic alliance is of major importance in terms 
of determining, not only the possibility of success of a specific collaborative arrangement, but 
also how those resources are effectively and efficiently aligned to meet the various strategic 
goals pursued. The degree of resource alignment achieved directly impacts the overall 
performance of the partnership, influences the likelihood of conflicts surfacing throughout the 
agreement and encourages collaborative forces to surface.  
 
According to Rumelt (1984), the impact of an organization’s portfolio of resources and 
relationships on its competitive positioning is extremely substantial. Das and Teng (2000) also 
supported this argument by verifying the critical influence of a firm’s resources on a more 
sustainable and profitable competitive strategy. In this sense, Peteraf (1993) claims the 
relevance of the bundle of resources owned by an organization, when differences in profitability 
cannot be fully accounted by external factors.   
 
This particular theory of strategic alliances is developed under the crucial belief in firms’ 
heterogeneity in terms of resources and capabilities. On the contrary, models designed mainly 
to include external conditions, such as the business environment and the industry, give rise to 
the idea that corporations are, amongst themselves, homogeneous (Barney, 1991).   
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Under the light of this theory, the several stages of preparing, designing, managing and 
evaluating the arrangement between partner firms are severely affected by the bundle of 
resources possessed by each party involved and such cooperative agreements should be 
designed with the ultimate goal of leveraging and enhancing the organizations’ competitive 
positioning vis-à-vis competitors (Das and Teng, 2000). 
3.2.2. LEARNING VALUE 
Anand and Khanna (2000) reflect about the possibility of organizational learning in a strategic 
alliance. Accordingly, these authors establish that learning opportunities are far more expected 
to occur in strategic alliances with structures where there is a high degree of interaction and 
involvement, as is the case of joint ventures. Organizations are more equipped to extract value 
from the operation in these situations, as there is a significant proximity amongst partner firms. 
 
Doz (1996) also reflects about the abundant learning opportunities originated by strategic 
alliances. The learning process of gathering proactive information about partner firm(s) 
constitutes a crucial driver in establishing a sense of confidence and compliance into a strategic 
alliance (Doz and Hamel, 1998). This sense of trust and acquaintance fuels the involved parties’ 
ability to generate value within the alliance. In this sense, the capacity to manage inter-firm’s 
relationships and the evolution of the strategic alliance is absolutely critical to enhance and 
potentiate the organizations’ skill to create value (Ireland et al., 2002).  
 
A strategic alliance comprises the exchange of know-how amongst partner firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1992). Accordingly, involved parties have the opportunity to learn from business 
associates, capturing new sets of methodologies, capabilities or strategies that could positively 
influence the firm’s overall performance.  
 
Partnerships do comprise a learning component. Ireland et al., 2002 refer the importance of 
learning opportunities that arise within a partnership, allowing involved managers to learn from 
the experience and improve current management’s ability. In fact, organizational learning 
appears as a dynamic capability of the company to develop key skills.  
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3.2.3. FINANCIAL VALUE AND THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
Chan et al. (1997) analyze the financial benefits of a strategic alliance, but referring solely to 
non-equity joint ventures (which is not the case study under examination). Even so, their 
conclusions are worth considering. The researchers have evidenced positive influences in the 
stock price of partner firms and, additionally, above-market operational performance and 
evaluation in the upcoming five years subsequently to the alliance formation. However, the 
authors found no evidence of wealth transfers amongst the involved parties in the agreement.  
 
When two or more firms intend to engage in a collaborative agreement, such represents an 
addition to the cost structure of all the parties involved. Thus, the theory of transaction costs 
encompasses the several additional expenditures that partner firms must incur throughout the 
life cycle of the strategic alliance, i.e. preparation, management and performance (Gulati, 
1995). The author describes some supplementary costs that arise at the strategic alliance level, 
presented below. 
 
In a first period, firms may incur in costs associated with the development and preparation of 
the partnership contract, namely the stages of elaborating the document that clearly defines all 
spheres of responsibilities and actions of the individual firms and, after which should be 
discussed amongst all relevant parties.  
 
Subsequently, and as the partnership evolves, firms must employ resources to oversee the level 
of compliance of the partner firm(s), in relation to the terms that were established in the 
foundation of the strategic alliance and act accordingly. In this sense, and should the partner 
firm(s) incur in some sort of failure or breach of the contract, corporations must develop 
strategies to deal with such liabilities and errors, which naturally impact the financial statements 
of the corporations.  
 
Strategic alliances may not always be the preferred corporate design for all firms. In light of 
the transaction cost theory, partnerships are the desired organizational structure if they allow 
for a minimization of the abovementioned transaction costs. Only in such scenario strategic 
alliances are more effective and efficient than market transactions or mergers (Jarillo, 1988). 
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In light of such theory, and according to the authors Barringer and Harrison (2000), the 
partnerships that experience the highest levels of success are the ones that are able to organize 
joint activities in a way that allows them to reduce both transaction and production 
expenditures.  
 
Accordingly, from a more financial standpoint, strategic alliances are desirable when the firms 
involved are able to: implement a sustainable process of controlling, monitoring and reducing 
coordination costs; create an efficient and inter-related structure of activity assignment amongst 
each firm; and, develop a communication and network flow throughout the duration of the 
partnership (Gulati, 1998). 
 
The transaction cost theory on strategic alliances emphasizes the need of monitoring and 
controlling the transactions performed with a partnership. 
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4. METHODOLOGY SECTION 
4.1. THE GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH: CASE STUDY 
The research method used to conduct this dissertation thesis is the case study. It is the most 
suitable method in order to provide results and learning outputs regarding the value drivers of 
strategic alliances for two reasons.  
 
Firstly, exploring the different value streams and timing in international strategic alliances 
imposes a mix between an explanatory and descriptive case study (Yin, 2013). The first method 
refers to the discover of rational and recurrent links in the way corporate strategies are designed 
in order to maximize the value generated from a specific internationalization, namely in terms 
of monetary and non-monetary outcomes, along a substantial period of time. The later covers 
the descriptive process of the operation, more precisely in assessing the different value streams 
that arise during a strategic alliance. 
 
Secondly, in line with this author, the analysis hereby proposed benefits from conducting a case 
study since there is absolutely no control over the events under analysis, given the actions report 
to the first decade of 2000. There is no opportunity for manipulation of data and there is a 
sufficient time distance to allow all the involved agents to analyze the alliance and its value 
creation process in a more rational and disinterested manner, in the end, elaborating a more 
objective, solid and unbiased conclusion. 
 
As the goal is not to test existing theories or models, it was adopted a more exploratory 
approach. The sub-research questions emerged from back and forth analysis between theory 
and data, reason why they were not included in the literature review section, but solely on the 
findings chapter.  
 
The case study mixes a content and process approach. A content approach was adopted when 
focusing more on the different drivers affecting the value creation process in strategic alliances 
(three separate streams of value are broadly defined, namely strategic, learning and financial 
benefits). A process approach is employed when the timing variable of the value creation 
process is relevant and present also in the history of the alliance process, chronologically.  
 
   17 
 
The original purpose of this research arises from a professional experience at the Business 
Development department of Brisa, motive that truly first triggered the company choice for 
conducting this case study analysis. The strategic alliance established by Brisa in CCR 
constitutes a valuable learning opportunity for several firms in relation to their 
internationalization efforts. The objective is to determine the most relevant features that are 
increasing value for the firm and derive lessons from the analysis. Taking into consideration 
the failure rate of strategic alliances, positive and fruitful partnerships, such as the case under 
examination, should be object of study and learning. 
 
Brisa was a suitable corporation to answer this research question for several reasons. The first 
cause that motivated this choice relies on the fact that the Brazilian operation encompassed 
several learning opportunities for the organization, as well as an outstanding financial return, 
meaning that Brisa was able to generate value. The success of the strategic alliance in CCR 
comprises positive conditions to analyze which are the factors that are causing firms to choose 
this specific entry mode and how organizations can create value from such choices, even taking 
into consideration that Brisa exited the Brazilian market in 2010. Secondly, this choice is based 
on the fact that this alliance was sustained for nine years and still, to this date, former partner 
firms still maintain positive relationships amongst one another. An additional motive is linked 
with the firm’s relevant and reference position revealed in the Portuguese market, being one of 
the main toll road operators in the world, allowing companies to derive conclusions that could 
benefit their own international strategic alliances. The last purpose of this decision is related 
with an easier and direct access to the necessary information, provided the importance of 
documentation and interviews for this research question.  
 
Despite having sold the equity stake in CCR, the Brazilian operation cannot be viewed as a 
failure; the reason why the firm withdrew the investment from that market is not concerned 
with disappointing returns, but is linked with minimizing the impact of the forecasted negative 
macro-trends of the Brazilian economy on Brisa’s results, on an asset portfolio management 
approach. 
   18 
 
4.2. THE CONCRETE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Regarding the collection data process, three main sources of evidence have been used: internal 
documents, interviews with several agents that were involved in the internationalization and 
archival records within the temporal boundary of the alliance.  
 
The documentation under analysis was provided by Brisa’s executives, with regards to written 
reports of events, annual reports, corporate presentations and other relevant written sources of 
data that display the choices adopted throughout the international strategic alliance established 
in Brazil and that are a source of valuable information to assess the value drivers of the 
partnership. 
 
The interviews have been conducted face-to-face, with one person at a time.  The interviewees 
can be classified into three different groups. Amongst the nine distinct interviews that have 
been carried out, there were two meetings with the top management of Brisa, namely the actors 
responsible for the Brazilian investment, who were in the field for a considerable amount of 
time during the operation. Additionally, four Brisa’s executives that were in Brazil were 
interviewed, who operated in different strategic spheres of the organization in order to run local 
operations alongside with the strategic partners. Lastly, three commuting executives of Brisa 
were questioned, providing a different perspective of the effects of the partnership, 
simultaneously, in Portugal and Brazil.  
 
The context in which the expansion was performed, the factors that led to this particular form 
of entry strategy and market, and the relevant outputs from a strategic, learning and financial 
standpoint have been the main issues addressed in the interviews. Exhibit 4 comprises the 
complete script that guided the individual meetings.  
 
The last source of data was gathered from archival records, more precisely equity research, 
within the time frame in which the strategic alliance was active. This information served to 
verify the evolution of financial indicators of both Brisa and CCR during the operation (at the 
light of the monetary benefits in the value creation process) and to properly define the economic 
conditions affecting the Portuguese and Brazilian markets in the first decade of 2000. 
 
   19 
 
The method employed to analyze the collected data is chronological. The rationale behind this 
approach is to include a descriptive process to this investigation and causal relationships 
between events. There are three crucial periods: preparation, management and exit of the 
strategic alliance in CCR.  
 
The financial value is measured in terms of cash inflows and outflows, as well as the 
computation of growth and return indicators. The strategic and learning value are measured 
through the perception of the interviewees.  
 
The relevance of the knowledge collected from the abovementioned documentation, interviews 
and archival records does not exclude the obligation to verify the data obtained with other 
sources of evidence and to prevent the influence of bias opinions or thoughts to hinge or skew 
the results obtained. Adequate sources are identified throughout the case study report, which 
allow to verify the information gathered internally at Brisa. 
 
Exhibit 5 discloses the detailed database of information gathered and used during this case study 
report. 
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5. CASE STUDY 
In this section it is developed a chronological description of the international strategic alliance 
established by Brisa in CCR. The Portuguese company decided to grow outside its domestic 
borders and entered into the Brazilian market in 2001, where it has engaged in an equity joint 
venture with local partners.  
 
The first two sub-sections aim to understand the micro and macro environments in which this 
strategic alliance arises, namely the features of the two major corporations involved, Brisa and 
CCR, and the national framework of both Portugal and Brazil in the period of this 
internationalization.  
 
The subsequent sub-sections are organized according to the three broad stages of the strategic 
alliance: preparation, management and exit of the operation. 
 
Note that all professionals that were interviewed are current Brisa’s executives. However, some 
have combined managerial functions in the governance bodies of CCR during the strategic 
alliance (Exhibit 6).  
 
For the case study, there are three entities worth highlighting: Brisa HQ in Portugal, CCR in 
Brazil and Brisa – Participações e Empreendimentos (hereinafter referred to as “BPE”) as the 
local subsidiary of Brisa in Brazil. 
 
5.1. COMPANIES’ OVERVIEW 
5.1.1. BRISA 
Brisa – Auto-Estradas de Portugal, S.A.4 is a Portuguese firm created in 1972, which has 
become the largest motorway operator in Portugal, and one of the largest in the world. 
 
                                                 
4 Brisa, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://www.brisa.pt/PresentationLayer/conteudo.aspx?menuid=271&localid=184 [accessed on 20 April 2015] 
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Brisa has three core business units, specifically motorway concessions, operation & 
maintenance services and other infrastructures/services. All corporate areas are managed in an 
autonomous fashion, while having motorways as the common denominator. The company 
contains in its portfolio (Exhibit 7) both domestic and international subsidiaries, ranging from 
operation of tolled highways to complementary units of road services (for instance safety and 
driving with comfort).  
 
In 2001 Brisa’s group employed 2880 employees and its corporate governance structure was 
based on two main bodies: the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee, whose 
members were allocated with the day-to-day management of a specific corporate affair.  
 
At the time, the firm operated 901 km in 9 motorways in Portugal, spread from north to south, 
east to west (Exhibit 8), which represented a market share of, approximately, 79% in terms of 
tolled concession motorways5. Market leader, Brisa developed and strengthened important 
skills in the areas of project management and highway operation and maintenance.  
 
In the beginning of 2000, Brisa was considered the fourth biggest listed company in the 
Portuguese Stock Exchange, with a market capitalization of roughly 3 billion euros, accounting 
for 8% of PSI-20, the Portuguese Stock Index where only the twenty largest listings in terms of 
market cap and share turnover are represented. Brisa was a listed company from 1997 until 
2013. 
 
It was crucial for the sustainability of Brisa’s business model to ensure strategic alliances with 
players in the construction industry, so that Brisa could act as a concessionaire. Simultaneously, 
the firm revealed a solid financial structure, with access to many sources of financing to support 
its ongoing operations (significant and stable EBITDA, moderate CAPEX, high yield and 
protected against deflation6). Exhibit 9 contains an historical evolution in Brisa’s performance 
until 2001. 
 
                                                 
5 Brisa 2015; “Annual Report 2001” 
6 Exane BNP Paribas, 2010; “Out of Brazil and into the unknown” 
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The process of internationalization started in 1999, when Brisa acquired a minor equity stake 
(0.5%) in the consortium Schemaventotto, which was designed to perform the privatization 
process of the Italian company, Autostrade, leader of the largest highway network in Europe. 
Accordingly, and in an indirect manner, Brisa was awarded a 0.15% share in the capital 
structure of the concessionaire. 
 
Brisa was considered an international reference in the toll road concession industry, which 
allowed the firm to be widely perceived as a desirable business partner with valuable know-
how and competences in motorway operation and maintenance.  
 
At this moment, Brisa was evaluating growth options outside its domestic market, since 
opportunities in Portugal appeared scarcer. 
5.1.2. CCR 
Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias7 is a joint venture established in 1998 by four of the 
largest construction players in the Brazilian market, namely Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo 
Corrêa, Odebrecht and Serveng Group, being rapidly considered one of the largest transport 
infrastructure holding companies in the world.  
 
The consortium was created via the merger of the stocks held by the abovementioned local 
players, through which CCR was awarded the concession and operation of several federal and 
state highways in Brazil. In 2001, the firm held in its portfolio five relevant road concessions 
in its domestic market, with 1,278 km of motorway network in operation, which represented, 
approximately, 14% in length market share in the Brazilian market, but 31% in terms of 
revenues8. 
 
                                                 
7 CCR, 2015 available [online] at:  
http://www.grupoccr.com.br/English/ccr-group/history-facts [accessed on 21 April 2015] 
8 CCR, 2015; “Annual Report 2001” available [online] at: 
http://ri.ccr.com.br/grupoccr/web/conteudo_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=47219 [accessed on 21 April 
2015] 
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The strategy followed by CCR was based on two main drivers, specifically the capitalization 
of synergies (in terms of operational efficiency and economies of scale) from a portfolio 
management perspective; and a constant search for external opportunities to potentiate 
domestic and international growth and diversify the asset portfolio under management (i.e. 
select new concessions to bid and broaden its bundle of highways in operation). 
 
The CCR group intended to employ an operational hedging policy, namely through a 
diversification in its services’ portfolio. Not only was the corporation active on the construction 
and concession sectors, but there were other growth options associated with other road related 
businesses, for instance advertising, leasing right-of-way for fiber optics and development of 
automatic systems for charging tolls.  
 
CCR had the knowledge and expertise in the construction sector, congregating credible and 
heavyweight Brazilian players (with international reputation) and an extremely relevant know-
how of how the local market operated in Brazil. 
 
Exhibit 10 refers to the historical evolution in CCR’s performance until 2001. 
 
At this moment in time, the consortium was actively searching for an international partner with 
critical competence in the operation of tolled motorways, area in which Brisa appeared as a 
front-runner.  
5.2. MACRO-ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT  
5.2.1. PORTUGAL  
Two major variables affect directly the top line and overall performance of the industry in which 
Brisa operates: the level of development and maturity in the road concession market and the 
macro-trends displayed in the Portuguese economic and social context. 
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In Portugal, the vast majority of road concession contracts are designed under a PPP model, i.e. 
public-private partnerships. The agreements are established between the granting entity, the 
Portuguese state directly, or through Estradas de Portugal9, the institution in charge of managing 
national roads, and private corporations, that will operate the assigned highways for a stipulated 
period of time.  
 
In 2001, the highway network was already at a mature state (including tolled and non-tolled 
roads) (Exhibit 11). In this period, Brisa occupied a dominant position in the tolled industry 
(with a market share close to 80% of the tolled motorway network), assuming the status of a 
natural monopolist, which was not necessarily well perceived by external entities10.  
 
The road concession industry in Portugal was severely restricted until the end of 2000. As a 
consequence, there was a tacit understanding that the company would step aside in future bids, 
with the purpose of allowing new players in the concession sector to enter that market11. 
 
Up until 2000, Portugal entered in a phase of growth and expansion, mainly due to a relevant 
increase in exports, which outperformed a reduction in domestic demand.  However, in 2001, 
Portugal was initiating a cycle of weak macro-trends and prospects12. 
 
From an annual average growth rate of 3.8% registered in 2000, the Portuguese GDP went on 
a downward trajectory, reaching an average growth rate of 1.9% in 2001. Up until this period, 
the domestic economy had always registered annual positive evolutions close to 4% or even 
above (Exhibit 12). 
 
From this moment on, there would be a deceleration in internal demand, triggered by a decrease 
in both public and private consumption. Confidence indexes amongst consumers were also 
decreasing, starting to resemble the figures registered in previous recession cycles.  
 
                                                 
9 Estradas de Portugal, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://www.estradasdeportugal.pt/index.php/pt/a-empresa/breve-historia [accessed on 21 April 2015] 
10 Francisco Rocio Mendes, Member of the Executive Committee of CCR, interviewed on 17 April 2015 
11 António Nunes Sousa, Member of the Board of Directors of CCR, interviewed on 16 April 2015 
12 OECD, 2015; “OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2001” available [online] at: 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-portugal-
2001_eco_surveys-prt-2001-en#page22 [accessed on 21 April 2015] 
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Moreover, the Portuguese inflation rate in 2001 was 3.78%13 (Exhibit 13); in contrast with the 
domestic average wage increases in collective hiring that did not meet the 4% mark 14 . 
Combining these two opposing forces, the domestic economy suffered a net decrease in the 
household available income and purchasing power, which directly affected Brisa’s top line.  
 
The sale of vehicles suffered a major decrease in 2001, indicator that also affected Brisa’s 
revenues. The sector related to four-by-fours (“veículos todo-o-terreno”) was the worst affected 
(-79%). The class of light passenger vehicles (“veículos ligeiros de passageiros”) also registered 
a reduction of 3.6% in this fiscal year15, resulting in a weak period for this industry. 
 
In addition, traffic growth in Portugal was negligent. Between 2000 and 2009, this indicator 
reached only a 0.3% CAGR16. 
 
The correlation between the deceleration of the Portuguese economy, the decrease in the 
household available income, the reduction in the sale of motor vehicles and traffic growth rate 
is clear, causing serious setbacks in the performance of Brisa in its home market. 
 
In 2001, as growth prospects were diminished in Portugal, an international expansion was the 
viable and best solution as a growth option for Brisa. 
5.2.2. BRAZIL  
Brazil was facing turbulent and volatile times until 2001. This instability in the country’s 
economic context can be first attested by an overview of the average growth rate of the 
Brazilian’s GDP. Until 2001, the historical figures did not disclose a consistent trajectory, either 
positive or negative. An evolution in the nation’s GDP of 3.4% in 1997 was followed by a 
stagnation period in the subsequent year, where Brazil did not accommodate any growth in its 
wealth, to a 4.3% increase in the beginning of the millennium (Exhibit 14). There was no 
stability and consistency in the evolution of Brazil’s economic path. 
                                                 
13 Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 
14 Brisa, 2015; “Annual Report 2001” 
15 Banco de Portugal, 2015; “Relatório do Conselho de Administração 2001” available [online] at: 
https://www.bportugal.pt/pt-PT/EstudosEconomicos/Publicacoes/RelatorioAnual/RelAnuaisAnteriores/ 
Documents/rel_01_p.pdf [accessed on 21 April 2015] 
16 Exane BNP Paribas, 2010; “Out of Brazil and into the unknown” 
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In addition, the astonishing inflation rates were causing too much pressure on the Brazilian 
economy, and was only since mid-1990’s, with the implementation of the Real Plan17, that the 
country was able to start evolving towards a much desired economic stability. The goal was to 
keep inflation at low levels, far from reaching values well above the two digits. Accordingly, 
the Central Bank was determined to ensure that the Brazilian inflation rate would not exceed 
the maximum values that were pre-established 18. Exhibit 15 covers the historical inflation rates 
in Brazil (for this purpose it was used the “Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo” 
(IPCA), the indicator in use by the Brazilian Federal Government). 
 
The combination of extremely high inflation rates and periods of economic stagnation, namely 
1998 and 1999, (Exhibit 14), instigated the increase of the interest rates supported by the 
Brazilian Federal Government, so to encourage potential investors into the acquisition of state 
debt securities19. The Selic rates in Brazil (which are the country’s prime rates) were severely 
high at the time, with two underlying goals: minimize the impact of exacerbated inflation rates 
and reduce the possibility of a potential depreciation of the Brazilian currency. 
 
Brazil was an emerging country, which revealed a great deal of political, economic and social 
vulnerability but, simultaneously, employing important efforts towards a fair level of 
stabilization and convergence. 
 
                                                 
17 The Real Plan (“Plano Real”) was designed in 1994 to implement a new currency in the country, the Brazilian 
Real (BRL), which was anchored to the U.S. dollar; 
The Brazil Business, 2015; “Plano Real Today” available [online] at: 
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/plano-real-today [accessed on 22 April 2015] 
18 Portal Brasil, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2012/04/inflacao [accessed on 22 April 2015] 
19 Economy Watch, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://www.economywatch.com/interest-rates/historical-interest-rates.html [accessed on 22 April 2015] 
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Between 1996 and 2000, Portugal was the fourth leading investor in Brazil, representing 6.8% 
of the total foreign direct investment in the country. Companies from the telecommunication 
and financial services sectors had the most expressive weight amongst all20. In this period, 
Portuguese corporations were being challenged to expand its operations to Brazil, as the country 
was perceived as an attractive destination for investment and where there was a wide range of 
business opportunities to be explored21. 
 
In Brazil, the management of motorways is responsibility of the private sector. The concession 
framework model was introduced in 1993 as a way to potentiate further investment and growth 
in the transport infrastructure industry. However, in 2001, from the 1,724,921 km of highways 
that already existed in Brazil, only on 0.58% (corresponding to 10,000 km in paved motorways) 
it was celebrated a concession agreement with private operators22.  
 
The Brazilian Federal Government started paying attention to the necessity of concession 
contracts for its network of motorways as a result of severe waves of criticism against the 
regulatory framework into force and the tolled highways. Despite the length of the network, 
only a minor section was paved and many improvements were still necessary. 
 
Unquestionably, Brazil was extremely attractive in the road concession industry, with a vast 
range of untapped business opportunities. The market was appealing to Brisa, with a high 
degree of challenge involved23. 
5.3. PREPARATION OF THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
Brisa was a pure player in the toll road concession industry, which was being negatively 
affected by weak Portuguese macro-trends, with the country risk displaying a poor trajectory. 
Consequently, internationalization was the preferred growth option for the company.  
 
                                                 
20 International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015; “Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil: regulations, 
flows and contribution to development” available [online] at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_report_brazil.pdf [accessed on 22 April 2015]  
21 Manuel Lamego, Member of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee of CCR, interviewed on 9 April 
2015 
22 CCR, 2015; “Annual Report 2001” available [online] at: 
http://ri.ccr.com.br/grupoccr/web/conteudo_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=47219 [accessed on 21 April 
2015] 
23 Manuel Matos, Treasury and Risk Manager of HQ (Brisa Portugal), interviewed on 14 April 2015 
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Accordingly, the firm started screening potential markets to operate, serving as guidelines the 
growth potential of a specific economy, the convergence in terms of risk, the compliance of the 
regulatory framework and the existence of business opportunities in which the firm was able to 
leverage core competences, namely project management and concession and operation of 
motorways24. Exhibit 16 includes the factors that conducted the country selection process for 
Brisa. 
 
In Brazil, the sector of motorway concessions was developing, and players in the construction 
arena intended to improve the conditions and security of the existent highways 25 . CCR’s 
shareholders were searching for the experience of an international business associate to assist 
in the process of concession and operation of the existing motorways. The notoriety and 
experience of Brisa were extremely desirable features for the Brazilian consortium. 
 
Brisa and CCR’s executives initiated business meetings even before the creation of the 
international venture, back in 1998. The degree of complementary resources and capabilities 
between both parties was expressively significant. Brisa possessed the know-how in the 
operation of highways to complement the major players in the construction sector in Brazil that 
constituted CCR.  
 
Several reasons led Brisa to enter that specific market: Brazil was a market with a very large 
dimension, requiring new entrants to have the dimension and/or notoriety to set up operations, 
successfully, in that country and Brisa met these specific criteria. In order to tackle this market, 
it was clear that going in alone was not an option. 
 
The potential growth rate and value creation of CCR26 were other drivers that led Brisa into 
entering the Brazilian market in 2001, in the form of an equity joint venture. This international 
operation was a significant investment and wager on the country’s economy and prospective 
evolution. The alliance represented an incredible business opportunity with Brisa assuming the 
status of an international strategic partner27. Exhibit 17 covers the investment criteria in CCR.      
                                                 
24 João Azevedo Coutinho, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of CCR, interviewed on 13 April 2015 
25 Manuel Lamego, Member of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee of CCR, interviewed on 9 April 
2015 
26 Manuel Matos, Treasury and Risk Manager of HQ (Brisa Portugal), interviewed on 14 April 2015 
27 Francisco Rocio Mendes, Member of the Executive Committee of CCR, interviewed on 17 April 2015 
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From the beginning of the internationalization process, the only entry mode conceivable for 
Brisa was a strategic alliance. The reason is that the firm wanted to enter the Brazilian market 
with local relevant players and leverage on their resources and competences. It was in Brisa’s 
best interest to explore business opportunities alongside valuable partners, so to stimulate the 
possibilities of winning more concession agreements in Brazil28. Local business associates have 
fundamental knowledge in that specific market and are fully aware of how the corporate 
network operates and evolves29. 
 
The equity stake acquired in the Brazilian consortium was the result of the dilution of the 
existing shares amongst the four initial shareholders, resulting in a 20% stake for each firm in 
the strategic alliance, thus ensuring equal representation and control. This capital distribution 
was a major priority for Brisa. The intention was to be as large as the largest equity holder, 
however without a dominant position in the capital structure of the partnership30, so that all 
involved parties were equals and with equivalent responsibilities and risks. 
 
Until 2003, Brisa increased its shareholding position in CCR, with an accumulated cash outflow 
of €183.2 million (Exhibit 18). All partners had the same representation, ensuring parity 
amongst all parties. For this operation, Brisa created a local subsidiary in Brazil, BPE, which 
was the legal entity holding the equity stake in CCR.  
 
A solid corporate governance structure was also a priority for Brisa, guaranteeing equilibrium 
and coverage against potential risks involved in a collaborative contract. The Board of Directors 
of CCR comprised two members from each company, with additional independent directors31, 
from which derived the Executive Board, which also had Brisa’s representation through the 
Director of BPE, who was permanently in Brazil (São Paulo). 
 
                                                 
28 João Azevedo Coutinho, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of CCR, interviewed on 13 April 2015 
29 Eduardo Costa Ramos, Finance Manager of HQ (Brisa Portugal), interviewed on 14 April 2015 
30 Manuel Lamego, Member of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee of CCR, interviewed on 9 April 
2015 
31 António Nunes Sousa, Member of the Board of Directors of CCR, interviewed on 16 April 2015 
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Brisa pursued several strategic goals in the alliance, namely to generate a profitable operation 
in an external market, always minimizing potential risks associated with emerging countries, 
but, above all, to take the leap of crossing the domestic boarders and start exploring foreign 
economies.  Overall, Brisa wanted to create value for the organization and to operate in the road 
concession industry in Brazil32. 
5.4. MANAGEMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
Less than one year after Brisa’s investment in Brazil, CCR went public33. It was the first 
corporation to be listed on the New Market of the São Paulo Stock Exchange and the Brazilian 
Mercantile & Futures Exchange 34 . This listing included firms that went beyond legal 
requirements in terms of corporate governance, using a more transparent and solid structure. 
 
The shares traded in the New Market were positively influenced (in terms of liquidity and value) 
by the great disclosure of corporate information and the increased level of security in the rights 
granted to shareholders. The IPO was a significant milestone for CCR, with the issue of 
16,963,601 common shares, representing 20% of the group’s capital, with an initial price of 
18.00 BRL/stock, which started trading on February 1st, 200235 . Exhibit 19 refers to the 
historical performance of CCR’s share price. The adherence to the New Market discloses the 
strong effort employed in a strong governance structure shared by all equity holders. Exhibit 
20 presents the shareholder composition of CCR at the end of 2002. 
 
                                                 
32 João Azevedo Coutinho, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of CCR, interviewed on 13 April 2015 
33 CCR, 2015 available [online] at:  
http://www.grupoccr.com.br/English/ccr-group/history-facts [accessed on 21 April 2015] 
34 BM&FBovespa, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-us/home.aspx?idioma=en-us [accessed on 27 April 2015] 
35 CCR, 2015; “Annual Report 2001” available [online] at: 
http://ri.ccr.com.br/grupoccr/web/conteudo_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=47219 [accessed on 21 April 
2015] 
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From the outset, Brisa wanted to ensure a positive flow in the communication patterns and 
involvement amongst partner firms, not only at a top management level, but also in running the 
day-to-day operations of the venture. Naturally, a trust-based business relationship is not built 
overnight. Brisa understood that fluidity in information was critical and intended to act also as 
another department within CCR, and not solely as a shareholder. The firm believed that a 
positive involvement did not come from enforcing a more formal and hierarchical interaction36. 
The proximity developed is even attested in the physical location of BPE’s office, which was 
in the same building as CCR’s headquarters. 
 
Brisa and CCR evolved in a cooperative trend. The firms gradually acknowledged that their 
complementary know-how was more valuable in an alliance, instead of facing the market 
individually. During the nine years of operation, there was a growing sense of trust in CCR 
(which fueled the investment and commitment of Brisa), but a constant insecurity surrounding 
the Brazilian market, which required strong financial hedging measures. 
 
Until 2003, there was an intense pressure and expectation in the operation. There was 
uncertainty towards the Brazilian economic conditions and future progress (Exhibit 14 and 
Exhibit 15), alleviated when the initial investment started to create value, with the distribution 
of dividends37. The national currency was expressively devaluing, which negatively affected 
the value of the investment in CCR. 
 
In fact, CCR generated its first dividend in 2003. In the subsequent period, there was a 
significant improvement in the macro-economic setting of the country. GDP was above 3% and 
in an upward trajectory, the political risk was stabilizing with the re-election of former 
president, Lula da Silva38, interest rates were decreasing and the Brazilian Real (BRL) was 
recovering in the financial markets. The dividends distributed by CCR to its shareholders were 
sufficient to amortize the initial investment made by Brisa in Brazil (Exhibit 18). 
 
                                                 
36 Manuel Bissaya Barreto, Finance Manager of BPE, interviewed on 20 April 2015 
37 Eduardo Costa Ramos, Finance Manager of HQ (Brisa Portugal), interviewed on 14 April 2015 
38 IHS, 2015; “Election 2006: President Lula Wins Second Term in Brazil”  available [online] at: 
https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-forecasting.html?id=106598770 [accessed on 28 April 2015] 
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During the strategic alliance, Brisa and CCR strengthened cooperative bonds through 
engagement in other road related projects outside the original partnership. Firms were involved 
as partners in the acquisition of Controlar, a Brazilian car inspection company, and in a 
concession agreement in the United States, Northwest Parkway39. 
 
The evolution of the strategic alliance was appealing. There was an active exchange and flow 
of information and experience circulating amongst all involved parties. Firms were leveraging 
its core resources and capabilities with the complement of what the other partners were bringing 
into the operation. Throughout this strategic alliance, all involved parties attempted to build a 
business relationship based on mutual cooperation, identification and confidence40. 
 
In the meantime, in its home nation, Brisa’s market capitalization was harshly affected by the 
international crisis, especially in 2008, when the firm’s valuation decreased close to 50% 
(Exhibit 21). Portugal’s GDP and traffic growth was negligent and the Consumer Price Index 
was weak41. Exhibit 22 provides an overview of the main events affecting Brisa’s operations 
and finance during the nine years of the strategic alliance in Brazil.  
 
Exhibit 23 and Exhibit 24 offer an overview of Brisa and CCR’s performance during the joint 
venture in Brazil. 
5.5. EXIT OF THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
In 2008, everything changed. The world economy was contracting42 . Portugal and Brazil 
registered negative evolutions in 2009 (Exhibit 12 and Exhibit 14) and the global crisis 
impacted nations in the four corners of the world. 
 
                                                 
39 Brisa, 2015; “Annual Report 2007” available [online] at: 
http://www.brisa.pt/ResourcesUser/Investidores/RelatoriosContas/EN/RC2007_UK.pdf [accessed on 28 April 
2015] 
40 Manuel Bissaya Barreto, Finance Manager of BPE, interviewed on 20 April 2015 
41 Exane BNP Paribas, 2010; “Out of Brazil and into the unknown” 
42 Brisa, 2015; “Annual Report 2009” available [online] at: 
http://www.brisa.pt/ResourcesUser/Investidores/RelatoriosContas/EN/BrisaReCInd9UK.pdf [accessed on 28 
April 2015] 
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The financial turmoil caused Brisa to rethink its asset portfolio management strategy in order 
to accommodate the new trends affecting its home market. Treasury and cash proceeds to inject 
in the domestic assets were causing pressure on the firm to make a decision regarding its 
presence in the alliance43. If the decision were to sell its equity stake in CCR, such would 
represent a very sizable transaction for Brisa, crystallizing significant value and allowing easing 
the firm’s debt structure in Portugal. 
 
Despite Brazil’s emerging country status, the future prospects were not attractive, as Brisa 
feared an inversion in the growth trajectory of the country44. In addition, the concession industry 
in the Brazilian market was more mature, attracting many new entrants. According to numerous 
interviewees, this was the perfect timing to leave45.  
 
The growth value of the CCR stake was not fully recognized in Brisa’s valuations. This 
investment had a heavy weight in Brisa’s market capitalization, close to 40%. In this sense, the 
firm was facing two options: “buy-more-and-consolidate” or sell the participation. 
 
The decision to exit the strategic alliance was carefully evaluated and designed by Brisa46. 
During the exit process, Brisa intended to maintain the positive relationships established with 
the partners in CCR and to carry out this period with responsibility and trust. Brisa’s concern 
was to ensure that this operation would not have negative ramifications for the remaining 
shareholders and all the proper diligences were held in that sense, as well as ensuring that all 
responsibilities were dully fulfilled by Brisa. All involved partners lived this exit peacefully. 
 
The experience and expertise of Brisa had been absorbed by CCR. In this moment, the marginal 
value accrued by Brisa to CCR was diminishing. At this point, it was more of a “financial 
investment” than actually creating strategic value for the venture47. 
 
                                                 
43 Raúl Jaques, Financial Manager of BPE, interviewed on 13 April 2015 
44 João Azevedo Coutinho, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of CCR, interviewed on 13 April 2015 
45 Manuel Matos, Treasury and Risk Manager of HQ (Brisa Portugal), interviewed on 14 April 2015 
46 Eduardo Costa Ramos, Finance Manager of HQ (Brisa Portugal), interviewed on 14 April 2015 
47 António Nunes Sousa, Member of the Board of Directors of CCR, interviewed on 16 April 2015 
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At the same time, from a dynamic portfolio management approach, Brisa would use the 
proceeds of the sale to fund future growth, both in its domestic and external markets (the firm 
was looking into the Indian and Turkish markets). The goal was to reinforce financial strength 
into the firm’s operations and focus on corporate reorganization. Replicating the “CCR model” 
in upcoming strategic alliances would frame future growth.  
 
During and after this process, there was no sense of disruption to the remaining running bodies 
of CCR. The consortium was constituted by a strong shareholder base, which was represented 
by a solid management team. The future was bright for the company.  
 
On June 23rd, 2010, Brisa announced, through a press release, the sale of its equity stake in 
CCR, 16.35% of the capital at the time. The operation was carried out gradually and through 
several installments. Brisa sold 6% of CCR shares directly to the controlling shareholders, 
which after the transaction held the majority of the equity (approximately 51%). The remaining 
10.35% were sold through a private placement, actively supported by the existing stockholders 
of the venture (Exhibit 25).  
 
The investment carried out by Brisa in CCR was close to €184 million and, nine years later, the 
company sold its equity stake, generating net proceeds of €1,156 million (excluding the 
dividends distributed throughout the partnership). During the period of the strategic alliance, 
CCR’s share price reflected an astonishing positive evolution from 2.64€ in 2002 to 21.05€ in 
2010, with an average growth rate of 696.74%.  
 
Brisa exited the strategic alliance in CCR in order to adjust its debt structure in Portugal and to 
cover against an extremely high country risk in Brazil. In this sense, Brisa traded a listed stake 
in one of the world’s leading transport infrastructure holding companies for a more dynamic 
asset portfolio management and reinvestment strategy. In the end, was it worth it? Did the firm 
create value in this strategic alliance? 
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6. FINDINGS 
6.1. AT WHAT STAGE OF THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE ARE FIRMS 
CREATING FINANCIAL, LEARNING AND STRATEGIC VALUE? DO 
THEY OCCUR IN THE SAME PERIOD? 
Firms are able to create value through strategic alliances (Chan et al., 1997). However, and in 
the case of Brisa’s venture in CCR, they did not arise during the same stage of the operation. 
 
Financial value is the clearest variable to measure. Value was first created during the 
management stage of the joint venture, when CCR generated its first dividend to shareholders, 
trend that persisted throughout the remaining partnership (Exhibit 18). During the strategic 
alliance, Brisa received €209.8 million in dividends from CCR (which outweighs the initial 
investment to acquire the equity stake in the joint venture), excluding other sources of cash 
inflows. This outcome supports existing theory, from a financial standpoint, where it is 
established that the value creation process only begins after the formation of the strategic 
alliance. 
 
On the contrary, the strategic and learning components of value are slightly more intricate to 
evaluate and may disprove current literature (acknowledging value creation only after the 
formation of the strategic alliance). Numerous interviewees described that the success of this 
internationalization process relied in the preparation period of the strategic alliance. In the 
words of Manuel Lamego, current Managing Director of Brisa Concessão Rodoviária, “the 
experience in Brazil was proof that screening potential markets and partners in advance is 
essential to create value from the operation”. Carrying out proper diligences in preparing the 
operation was one of the factors that allowed Brisa to create and capture value. 
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The process of arranging the partnership encompassed several learning opportunities for top 
executives, enabling them to better run the day-to-day operations, both in Portugal and Brazil, 
and to improve and/or master corporate skills required for future foreign operations. Such 
learning process was critical during the management stage of the strategic alliance, since all the 
groundwork had already been done. Naturally, adaptation was necessary. António Nunes 
Sousa, current Member of the Executive Committee of Brisa, states that “getting acquainted 
with business practices in Brazil was a challenge, since not every corporate feature is 
exportable”. However, the exhaustive homework allowed minimizing and foreseeing possible 
queries that could have arisen.  
 
In addition, and since Brisa was entering unknown foreign territory, preparation was even more 
valuable to anticipate possible limitations and shortcomings. Thus the relevance of accurately 
screening probable partner firms so to enhance the likelihood of maximizing the value created 
and captured. Careful and previous resource (both human and financial) allocation also fueled 
the value created in this strategic alliance. João Azevedo Coutinho, current CFO of Brisa, states 
that “the firm attempted to cast the most suitable executives to involve in the Brazilian 
operation, and not the ones who could be spared from headquarters”.   
 
6.2. WHICH IS THE MOST DOMINANT FORM OF VALUE CREATED IN A 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE? 
In the words of Eduardo Costa Ramos, currently Head of Business Development at Brisa, the 
strategic alliance was a “massive success, especially in the value creation process”. Raúl 
Jaques, at the time Finance Manager of BPE, describes the partnership as a “perfect 
performance, with an outstanding valuation”. Francisco Rocio Mendes, former Member of the 
Executive Committee of CCR, defined the experience as “unrepeatable”. 
 
Outstanding financial value is, unquestionably, the most dominant driver in the value creation 
process of this strategic alliance.  
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All interviewees, without exception, identified the financial variable as the most relevant, 
considering the amounts involved in the stake disposal, the dividends received throughout the 
alliance and the amount initially invested to acquire a share in the capital structure of CCR 
(Exhibit 26). In the words of João Azevedo Coutinho, current CFO of Brisa, “the financial 
value was overriding, being the strategic alliance a means to an end”.  
 
The real and final internal rate of return (IRR48) of the investment, considering the sale of the 
equity stake into the computations, was 20.97%, representing the estimated growth rate of the 
alliance, since 2001. The rate computed by the author is slightly below the forecasts of Exane 
BNP Paribas “Out of Brazil and into the unknown”, which estimated the equity IRR to be 27% 
(Exhibit 27).  
Also, using the Discounted Cash Flow valuation model, it becomes incontestable the extreme 
profitability expected from this international strategic alliance, representing a Net Present Value 
(NPV49), in 2010 values, of €1,300,149,252.  
 
From these two indicators, IRR and NPV, it is possible to conclude that this venture delivered 
remarkable monetary returns for Brisa. However, these two financial indicators do not reveal 
any findings in terms of strategic and learning value created in the operation.  
 
6.3. HOW ARE FIRMS DEALING WITH THE PROCESS OF INCORPORATING 
THE VALUE CREATED INTERNATIONALLY? 
Brisa, in its growth strategy, establishes, broadly, value creation as the key measure to evaluate 
portfolio evolution, i.e. optimize the value created in current businesses and new investments 
should increase portfolio’s present profitability.  
 
                                                 
48 The discount rate often used in capital budgeting that makes the net present value of all cash flows from a 
particular project equal to zero 
Investopedia, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/irr.asp [accessed on 7 May 2015] 
49 NPV is used in capital budgeting to analyze the profitability of an investment or project 
Investopedia, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp [accessed on 7 May 2015] 
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Financial value created and captured in the strategic alliance (Exhibit 26) was extremely 
important for Brisa’s financing strategy, as it allowed the firm to avoid resourcing to the debt 
markets during the global crisis initiated in 2008 to fund its assets under management.  
 
From a strategic perspective, all interviewees clearly identified several value streams that 
affected both their ability as executives and Brisa’s policies.  
 
The strategic alliance in CCR endorsed Brisa to define partnerships as the preferential entry 
mode for future international endeavors, revealing a high level of value creation potential. The 
differences and uncertainty associated to an external market caused Brisa’s managers to 
properly comprehend the critical factors one should account in order to extract value from an 
international collaborative agreement. In this sense, the firm is better equipped to tackle foreign 
operations, widening its growth options and its vision of the world. The internationalization 
official strategy was to “replicate the CCR value creation model”. 
 
Additionally, alignment and complement in terms of partner resources and competences was 
extremely valuable for the learning opportunity encompassed in the operation. Several 
interviewees identified this component as one of the critical success factors of the Brazilian 
adventure. The best domestic corporate practices were extremely significant in the international 
management of the venture and leverage of partners’ strengths.  
 
The alliance introduced a new management by objectives policy, addressed mainly to the top 
executives of the firm. There was an alignment between results and incentives, increasing the 
relevance of the variable compensation of Directors. 
 
Sustainable risk management was other corporate learning opportunity for the firm. This 
experience allowed Brisa’s executives to understand, practically, how to effectively cover the 
firm’s operations against possible risks that may arise during an internationalization process, 
such as exchange and interest rate risks.  
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Flexibility in management was another learning experience captured by Brisa, because despite 
the heavy and deep preparation, there are certain corporate aspects that require elasticity and 
openness to proper deal with them. This feature was extremely important in future expansion 
processes engaged by the firm. The potential unknown territories, somehow after Brazil, did 
not seem so unknown.  
 
Such flexibility does also apply to local partners, as Brisa’s managers were able to witness the 
agility and mobility of Brazilian associates and learn from them. Native associates are the best 
at managing local corporate networks, so that international allies can leverage from that 
knowledge. The ability to broaden horizons was severely central for the human capital involved 
in the operation. The skills of adaptation to new markets and sharing responsibilities with 
different backgrounds were extremely valuable for Brisa’s executives. Moreover, as of this 
experience, the firm was more willing to explore market companies, with whom it may create 
future partnerships.  
 
Managing complex situations was another learning opportunity for Brisa’s executives. The 
process of dealing with more intricate operations that require creativity in terms of solutions 
was extremely valuable. Managers were able to look beyond the obvious and close 
surroundings in order to find the most appropriate and sustainable resolutions for a corporate 
hazard. Answers might come from the more unexpected sources. 
 
Notwithstanding, the majority of the interviewees have identified restrictions in the strategic 
and learning value incorporated by the firm. The learning opportunities were almost closed to 
the executives involved directly with the strategic alliance, rather than the organization as a 
whole. Manuel Bissaya Barreto, former Finance Manager of BPE, states that “Brisa’s 
executives in Portugal learned, but this process was limited. The exchange of know-how could 
have been much more developed”.  
 
6.4. WHAT ROLE DID THE EXIT OF THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE PLAY IN 
THE VALUE CREATION PROCESS? 
The financial value creation process ended with the exit of the strategic alliance in CCR.  
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Naturally, when Brisa proceeded with the disposal of its equity stake in the venture, it forfeited 
the right to continue on receiving dividends and other sources of cash inflow. Thus, the financial 
stream was concluded. However, Brisa could have pursued the opportunity to remain active in 
the joint venture, continuing to accumulate cash inflows from CCR (Exhibit 28).   
 
The prospective growth rate of that decision would hamper the creation and capture of financial 
value from the strategic alliance (an IRR of 12.27%50, if Brisa had decided to sell its equity 
stake in CCR in December, 2014, in comparison with 20.97%, which is the real case). 
Consequently, in order to maximize the monetary value chain of the operation, exiting Brazil 
at that time was the most appropriate decision on this manner. 
 
From a learning perspective, the value creation process was experienced in a long-lasting 
manner and went beyond this operation. All interviewees were able to identify both personal 
and corporate capabilities that were altered, consequence of the strategic alliance and that are 
still present to this day in their management ability and in the overall strategies pursued by 
Brisa. In the previous research question, the learning variables that were incorporated during 
the venture are a reflection of Brisa’s policies and norms in present days. However, the 
exchange of know-how between partners was limited to the nine years of operation in Brazil, 
i.e. the learning value creation process ended with the terminus of the partnership. Some 
respondents defined this development as circumscriptive to the period in which the alliance was 
active, and that this component could have been more developed by Brisa.  
 
Several interviewees acknowledge timing as key in the value creation process. Mastering the 
decisions regarding when to enter and exit the strategic alliance strictly impacted the amount 
of value that Brisa was able to extract from the venture, not only in terms of financial benefits, 
but non-monetary advantages as well.  
 
                                                 
50 Assumptions: 
(i): Same equity stake as during the international strategic alliance – 17.90% 
(ii): Immaterial cash outflows to manage the venture 
(iii): Expected dividends were calculated taking into consideration real values from CCR (Exhibit 28) 
(iv): Until 2010 it was used a WACC between 5.5% and 7.3% 
(v): After 2010 it was used a Ke of 12.1% 
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6.5. IS THE COMPETITIVE POSITIONING OF A FIRM IN ITS DOMESTIC 
MARKET AFFECTED BY THE VALUE CREATED AND CAPTURED IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE? 
This research question refers directly to the strategic value form. Are the two operations 
independent or interdependent? This specific question split the interviewees in half, with one 
group seeing no causal relationship between the value created in the strategic alliance in Brazil 
and the competitive positioning of Brisa in its home market, i.e. the level of contamination and 
influence was extremely low, whilst other respondents attested that the success and learning of 
the operation allowed the firm to better establish in its domestic jurisdiction. Accordingly, from 
the interviews, there is no solid conclusion to this research question. 
 
Until 2007, Brisa’s valuation evolved, on average, 111%, from a stock price of €4.76 to €10.05 
(Exhibit 21). During the same period, its operational efficiency registered an increase of roughly 
30% (Exhibit 23). However, there are limitations in assessing whether this positive trajectory 
of the firm’s performance is direct result of the value created in the strategic alliance, or if is 
due to appealing macro-trends in Portugal.  
 
From this growth, it is possible to state that the arguments supported by Chan et al. (1997) in 
regards to the financial value created in non-equity joint ventures also apply to operations 
involving equity agreements. In the five years after the beginning of the strategic alliance of 
Brisa in CCR, both entities displayed significant improvements in their operational and stock 
figures. The Brazilian consortium went from a €2.64 share price in 2002 to €10.55 in 2007, 
representing an increase of close to 300% (Exhibit 19) and an improvement in its operation 
efficiency of roughly 200% (Exhibit 24). 
 
In 2008, the financial crisis impacted Brisa’s overall asset portfolio management strategy, with 
the financial value created in the strategic alliance being injected into Portuguese assets and in 
a corporate reorganization. Without the outstanding monetary value, Brisa would have to access 
the debt markets during the crisis, imposing too much pressure on the financing options of the 
firm. The significant proceeds from CCR’s sale were employed to amortize debt and to fund 
future growth.  
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In 2010, Brisa’s market capitalization was roughly 3 billion euros, the same as in 2001 
(excluding dividends distributed), and through the corporate reorganization, Brisa was able to 
secure a strong financial rating from top agencies. However, throughout the subsequent period, 
the Portuguese macro-trends were weak and displaying a poor outlook. Brisa was severely 
penalized, with the firm’s valuation decreasing close to 50% between 2010 and 2013 (year in 
which Brisa stopped being a listed company) and its top line performance and EBITDA 
generation were on a downward trajectory, which was a severely high problem to tackle for the 
organization (Exhibit 29). 
 
In 2012, Brisa and Ascendi, another concessionaire operating in Portugal, represented a 60% 
combined market share of the domestic tolled motorway, with Brisa accumulating the highest 
amount in revenues51. Despite the relevant position of the firm in the industry still today, Brisa 
is far from the 80% individual market share secured in 2001. The industry has far more entrants, 
comprising 24 companies operating in the sector.  
 
 
                                                 
51 Diário Económico, 2015 available [online] at: 
http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/brisa-e-ascendi-detem-quota-de-60-no-sector_203946.html  
[accessed on 24 May 2015]  
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7. MAIN CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1. MAIN CONCLUSIONS  
In a strategic alliance, the different forms of value do not arise during the same stage of the 
operation, but they act as enablers to the overall value creation process of the partnership.  
 
Financial value was first created during the management period of the venture. Nonetheless, 
the preparation stage of the alliance was fundamental and encompassed several learning 
opportunities for the firm. Current literature only acknowledges the value creation process after 
the formation of strategic alliances. 
 
The most dominant form of value in strategic alliances is the financial component. However, 
there are severe barriers in the measurement of the other two forms of value and in assessing if 
they outweigh the financial advantages.  
 
Firms and managers are able to learn from partnerships and incorporate those learning 
opportunities into their current management challenges, both at an organizational and 
individual level.  
 
From a financial standpoint, the value creation process is complete with the exit of the strategic 
alliance. The same is concluded for the learning stream. However, firms absorb the learning 
value in a long-lasting manner. 
 
The financial value created in a strategic alliance is not sufficient to impact, in a positive 
fashion, the competitive positioning of the firm in its home market in periods of crisis. This 
way, the effect of strategic value created during the internationalization was limited and it is 
not strong enough to invert weak macro-trends.  
 
Researchers have found evidence of above-market returns and serious improvements in the 
operational efficiency of non-equity joint ventures. However, the case under examination also 
proves this argument, but referring to equity agreements. 
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This research did not find any determinant and material features of the international aspect of 
the alliance that could affect the value creation process. 
 
In fact, in today’s business world, full of complexity and uncertainty, “no company go it alone”. 
Strategic alliances are “a necessity” to tackle the value creation potential of business 
opportunities and even though this “means to an end” seems to be a high value management 
tool, we still need to go deeper into its causes and long-lasting effects. 
7.2. LIMITATIONS 
There are limits in assessing whether the learning and strategic value created through the 
operation were worth more than the financial return. Every respondent identified both personal 
and corporate competencies that were improved after this operation, attesting the learning 
opportunity and upgrade on managerial capabilities through this strategic alliance.  
 
Measuring these two forms of value is an intricate process, supporting literature trends that 
reflect the cloudiness surrounding the value concept. One additional characteristic for the 
definition may reflect the degree of subjectivity involved in finding proper metrics to evaluate 
the value created and that the concept may include several time horizons in its assessment.  
 
Another limitation to a more profound analysis of the strategic value created in a strategic 
alliance is finding suitable metrics to measure this component. Overall performance, market 
share evolution and stock figures do not discriminate between the impact of economic trends 
affecting the business and the influence of the value created in an international endeavor.  
 
The strategic and learning components were measured through the interviewees’ perceptions, 
thus including a fair degree of subjectivity in the analysis, causing the financial value to be the 
sole component with proper and reliable metrics. 
7.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although this research attempted to provide a more integrated overview on the different forms 
of value that could arise during an international strategic alliance, further investigation is still 
necessary. 
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It would be interesting to develop more reliable metrics to evaluate the strategic value created 
by firms in partnerships. A detailed analysis comprising the real impact of the value created 
internationally, removing the influence of the country’s economic trends, therefore assessing 
the degree of independence or inter-dependence of both domestic and foreign operations. 
 
Moreover, it would also be interesting to assess the learning value in alliance portfolio 
management. Accordingly, it would be of relevance to investigate firms’ performance in 
strategic alliances as their experience enlarges, and how this component affects the other forms 
of value, strategic and financial, created in international partnerships.   
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8. EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT 1 – NUMBER OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES (1989-1999) 
 
Exhibit 1: Number of Domestic and International Strategic Alliances (1989-1999) 
Source: “International Strategic Alliances: Their Role in Industrial Globalization”, Kang and 
Sakai, 2000. 
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EXHIBIT 2 – RESOURCE-BASED THEORY VERSUS TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
 Resource-Based Rationale Transaction Cost Rationale 
Logic behind the 
Ownership 
Decision 
Maximizing firm value through gaining 
access to other firms’ valuable 
resources. (Madhok, 1997; Ramanathan 
et al., 1997) 
“Minimizing the sum of 
production and transaction 





“A firm will favor acquisitions over 
joint ventures when the assets it needs 
are not commingled with other unneeded 
assets within the firm that holds them, 
and hence can be acquired by buying the 
firm or part of it”. (Hennart & Reddy, 
1997) 
High transaction costs (i.e. high 
asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency of the 
transactions and high costs for 
controlling opportunistic 
behavior) and/or low 
production costs (i.e. 
coordinating and learning). 
(Kogut, 1988) 
 “If the market is munificent or the firm 
is pursuing a strategy for which it has 
extensive resource capabilities, there is 
much less incentive to cooperate. Firms 
are more likely to continue alone”. 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996) 
 
Strategic Alliances Alliances preferred “when the critical 
inputs required to pursue the opportunity 
are owned by different parties and when 
these inputs are inseparable from the 
other assets of the owner firms”. 
(Ramanathan et al., 1997) 
Medium transaction and 
production costs, i.e. “when the 
transaction costs associated 
with an exchange are 
intermediate and not high 
enough to justify vertical 
integration”. (Gulati, 1995) 
 “Collaborations are a useful vehicle for 
enhancing knowledge in critical areas of 
functioning where the requisite level of 
knowledge is lacking and cannot be 
developed within an acceptable 
timeframe or cost”. (Madhok, 1997) 
 
“JV’s are formed when 
transactional hazards suggest 
that internalization is 
efficient… but constraints of 
various kinds prohibit full 
internalization”. (Ramanathan 
et al., 1997) 
 
“The situational characteristics 
best suited for a joint venture 
(rather than a contract) are high 
uncertainty over specifying and 
monitoring performance, in 
addition to a high degree of 
asset specificity”. (Kogut, 
1988) 
Exhibit 2: Resource-Based Theory vs. Transaction Cost Theory 
Source: “A Resource-Based Theory of Strategic Alliances”, Das and Teng, 2000 
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EXHIBIT 3 – VALUE DEFINITIONS 




Estimates of the parameters of the possible price 
distribution for the subject property as of a given date 
Pricing 
Literature 
Leszinski and Marn 
(1997) 
Trade-off between customer’s perceptions of benefits 
received and sacrifices incurred 
Zeithaml (1988) 
Different definitions of value with reference to 
consumers: 
 Low price (focus on sacrifice) 
 Whatever the consumer wanted in a product or 
service (focus on benefits) 
 The quality obtained for the price paid (trade-off 
between one sacrifice component and one benefit 
component) 
 Total benefits obtained for a total sacrifice 





Enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-
state of existence is personally or socially preferable to 




Porter (1985) What buyers are willing to pay 
Naumann (1985) 
Meeting or exceeding customers’ expectations in 
product quality, service quality and value-based prices 
Band (1991) 
Three features of customers’ value: 
 Quality 
 Cost (monetary and non-monetary) 
 Schedule (delivery: quantity time and place) 
Exhibit 3: Value Definitions 
Sources: Adapted from “Added value: its nature, roles and sustainability”; Chernatony, Harris 
and Riley (2000). 
“A statistical definition of value”; Max Kummerow (2002). 
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EXHIBIT 4 – DETAILED INTERVIEWS’ SCRIPT 
1. Qual era o seu envolvimento e papel no processo de internacionalização para o Brasil? 
2. Quando começou esse mesmo processo de entrada no mercado Brasileiro? 
3. Nessa altura, qual foi a razão que potenciou esta decisão de crescimento? E porquê 
internacionalmente? Havia oportunidades relevantes no mercado doméstico? 
4. Como é que a Brisa chegou à decisão de escolher o Brasil como mercado-alvo? Quais 
foram os factores considerados mais relevantes nesta escolha? Este mercado foi uma 
primeira escolha? 
5. Quais foram os objectivos estratégicos (financeiro, aprendizagem, competências, etc.) 
que motivaram o desejo de ter uma presença no mercado Brasileiro? 
6. Nesta operação, e em termos de capital humano, qual era o rácio entre executivos 
(expatriados e presentes localmente) e não-executivos (pessoas em permanente 
rotação)? 
7. Na sua opinião, qual era a importância estratégica do Brasil para a Brisa, em 
comparação com a capacidade da empresa em explorar devidamente o mercado? 
8. Como é que foi o processo de escolha do modo de entrada no mercado? A Brisa fez 
alguma pesquisa no âmbito de perceber qual seria a tipologia mais sustentável em 
termos internacionais? 
9. De acordo com a informação recolhida, a Brisa estabeleceu uma aliança estratégica 
internacional com parceiros no Brasil. Que característica de alianças estratégicas 
considera que foi mais relevante na escolha desta parceria local? 
10. Anteriormente a esta operação, alguma vez a Brisa tinha formado uma aliança 
estratégica internacional? Se sim, como é que foi feita a gestão desse portfolio de 
parcerias? Algum benefício adicional relevante para a operação do Brasil de 
experiências passadas? 
11. Quais foram, na sua opinião, os factores mais relevantes que poderiam, a priori, 
causar preocupação numa aliança internacional e que a Brisa deveria ter em 
consideração? 
12. Tendo estabelecido o modo de entrada no mercado Brasileiro, nomeadamente uma 
aliança estratégica, como foi escolhida o modo de aliança? Quão alto/baixo era o grau 
de interação e envolvimento que a empresa queria estabelecer? 
13. Quais foram os factores que levaram a Brisa a estabelecer uma aliança estratégica com 
estes parceiros em específico? Foi feita alguma análise prévia? 
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14. No processo de escolha dos parceiros locais, diria que o conjunto de recursos e 
competências dos aliados, juntamente com a potencial compatibilização com o 
aglomerado de recursos e competências da Brisa foi essencial? No fundo, qual foi a 
extensão de importância atribuída aos assets e skills dos potenciais parceiros? 
15. No processo de escolha dos parceiros locais, em que medida a decisão foi tomada, 
maioritariamente, em função da minimização dos custos adicionais da operação 
(preparação, gestão e performance)? Diria que esta foi a variável mais relevante ou 
outros factores pesaram na decisão? 
16. Qual foi o período de tempo decorrido entre tomar a decisão de estabelecer uma 
parceria no Brasil e o começo efectivo das operações naquele mercado? 
17. Qual foi a evolução da operação no Brasil? Como é que se foi desenvolvendo? 
18. Quais os parâmetros (financeiro, estratégico, aprendizagem, competências, etc.) que 
permitem classificar esta operação como fonte de valor para a empresa? 
19. Quais foram as três maiores lições que a Brisa retirou da sua experiência com 
parceiros internacionais? 
20. Qual o peso do retorno financeiro no sucesso desta operação? As expectativas iniciais 
foram ultrapassadas? 
21. Como definiria a relação entre o investimento inicial necessário (tanto em termos 
financeiros como de recursos e competências) com os resultados alcançados? 
22. Acredita que esta experiência no Brasil permite à Brisa a gestão mais eficiente e 
valiosa de alianças estratégicas futuras? Diria que o conhecimento e experiências 
geradas nesta operação conferem à empresa uma vantagem competitiva na gestão de 
alianças estratégicas? 
23. Em que medida o valor gerado por esta operação foi sentido por todos os stakeholders 
da empresa? 
24. Enquanto manager, consegue identificar competências/skills que conseguiu melhorar 
depois desta experiência? 
25. Consegue identificar alguma componente na gestão da Brisa que foi alterada em 
consequência desta operação?  
26. Quais os factores que, na sua opinião, impediram a Brisa de gerar ainda mais valor 
com esta experiência? 
27. Quais foram as principais razões que levaram a Brisa a sair do mercado Brasileiro? 
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28. Dentro do sucesso da operação, qual o balanço que faz entre a parte do retorno 
financeiro e parte dos ganhos ao nível de gestão e competências? 
29. Em que medida o sucesso da parceria no Brasil teve impacto na posição competitiva 
da Brisa no mercado doméstico? 
30. Como é que vê o Brasil hoje em dia? Faria sentido reentrar no mercado? Se sim, 
porquê? 
31. Se tivesse que escolher uma palavra/expressão para caracterizar o processo de 
internacionalização da Brisa para o Brasil, qual seria? 
Exhibit 4: Detailed Interviews’ Script 
Source: Document produced by the author 
EXHIBIT 5 – INFORMATION DATABASE FOR THE CASE STUDY REPORT 
Nature of 
evidence 
Type of source 







April 13th 2015 – 
April 16th 2015 
Two interviews with 
executives that were in charge 
of the Brazilian investment 
Interviews with 
Brisa’s Expatriates 
April 9th 2015 – 
April 20th 2015 
Four interviews with 
executives that were 




April 14th 2015 – 
April 16th  
2015 
Three interviews with 





2001, 2007, 2009 
Available on paper (2001) and 




Available online (2001 and 
2002) 
Equity Markets and 
Research 
Presentations 
May 2010 – 
December 2010 
Three documents prepared by 
Santander and BNP Paribas in 
reference to the sale of the 
equity stake in CCR (available 
on paper) 




Type of source 







June 2010 - 
December 2010 
Six internal presentations with 
the overview of the sale of the 
equity stake in CCR (available 
on paper) 
Legal Contract of the 
Sale of the Equity 
Stake in CCR 
June 22nd 2010 
One legal document of the 
alienation of the participation 
in CCR (available on paper) 
Financial Risk 
Management in the 
Investment in Brazil 
April 4th 2006 
One internal document 
defining the risk management 
strategy in the Brazilian 






April 20th 2015 – 
April 21st 2015 
Access to Brisa and CCR’s 
websites to gather further 
historical data on the firms  
Corporate Websites 
(Financial) 
April 21st 2015 – 
April 28th 2015 
Access to several websites to 
gather financial data on the 
macro-economic environment 
(properly identified in the 
footnotes and references) 
Exhibit 5: Information Database for the Case Study Report 
Source: Document produced by the author 
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EXHIBIT 6 – CORPORATE FUNCTIONS OF BRISA’S EXECUTIVES (2001/2015) 
 Managerial Functions 
Brisa’s Interviewed 
Professionals 
At the time of this case study Currently 
Manuel Lamego 
Member of the Board of 
Directors and Executive 
Committee of CCR 
Managing Director of Brisa 
Concessão Rodoviária 
João Azevedo Coutinho 
Vice-Chairman of the Board 
of Directors of CCR 
CFO of Brisa – Auto-
Estradas de Portugal 
António Nunes Sousa 
Member of the Board of 
Directors of CCR 
Member of the Board of 
Directors and the Executive 
Committee of Brisa – Auto-
Estrada de Portugal 
Francisco Rocio Mendes 
Member of the Executive 
Committee of CCR 
Partner of TIIC – Transport 
Investment Company 
Raúl Jaques Finance Manager of BPE 
Senior Controller of Brisa – 
Auto-Estradas de Portugal 
Manuel Bissaya Barreto Finance Manager of BPE 
Product Manager of Via 
Verde Portugal 
Manuel Matos 
Treasury and Risk Manager 
of HQ (Brisa Portugal) 
Head of Finance of Brisa – 
Auto-Estradas de Portugal 
Eduardo Costa Ramos 
Finance Manager of HQ 
(Brisa Portugal) 
Head of Business 
Development Unit of Brisa – 
Auto-Estradas de Portugal 
Cláudia Garcia 
Senior Controller of HQ 
(Brisa Portugal) 
Senior Controller of Brisa – 
Auto-Estradas de Portugal 
Exhibit 6: Corporate Functions of Brisa’s Executives (2001/2015) 
Source: Document produced by the author 
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EXHIBIT 7 – BRISA’S CORPORATE PORTFOLIO 
 
Exhibit 7: Brisa's Corporate Portfolio 
Source: Brisa’s Internal Documentation, 2015 
EXHIBIT 8 – BRISA’S NETWORK OF HIGHWAYS IN KM 
 
Exhibit 8: Brisa's Network of Highways (KM) 
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EXHIBIT 9 – BRISA’S PERFORMANCE BEFORE THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE IN EUR (1995-
2001) 
EUR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Market Capitalization -- -- 1 973,1 3 007,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 
- Cash & Equivalents 2,7 4,4 4,9 16,7 12,1 2,3 82,8 
+ Preferred & Other 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,7 
+ Total Debt 584,2 644,9 789,7 919,2 867,2 896,5 1 637,1 
Enterprise Value -- -- 2 757,9 3 910,2 855,0 894,2 1 558,0 
Revenue, Comparable 194,3 213,5 245,2 314,2 347,5 388,0 445,6 
  Growth %, YoY 12,1 9,9 14,8 28,1 10,6 11,7 14,9 
EBITDA 108,0 177,0 208,3 252,8 273,9 310,6 353,2 
  Margin % 55,6 82,9 84,9 80,5 78,8 80,1 79,3 
Net Inc, Comparable 42,9 60,5 105,1 140,0 168,7 202,6 212,1 
  Margin % 22,1 28,3 42,9 44,6 48,5 52,2 47,6 
EPS, Comparable 0,00 0,00 0,18 0,23 0,28 0,34 0,36 
  Growth %, YoY -- -- -- 33,2 20,7 20,2 5,2 
Exhibit 9: Brisa's Performance before the Strategic Alliance in EUR (1995-2001) 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 
EXHIBIT 10 – CCR’S PERFORMANCE BEFORE THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE IN EUR (1995-
2001) 
EUR 1999 2000 2001 
Market Capitalization -- -- -- 
- Cash & Equivalents 41,9 39,1 32,8 
+ Preferred & Other -5,0 -1,5 3,1 
+ Total Debt 445,9 600,8 611,0 
Revenue, Comparable 308,0 414,6 417,6 
  Growth %, YoY -- 34,6 0,7 
Gross Profit 110,3 166,2 188,6 
  Margin % 35,8 40,1 45,2 
EBITDA 181,8 244,0 259,6 
  Margin % 59,0 58,9 62,2 
Net Inc, Comparable -150,5 -50,2 -60,2 
  Margin % -48,9 -12,1 -14,4 
EPS, Comparable -1,32 -0,44 -0,10 
  Growth %, YoY -- 70,7 71,8 
         Exhibit 10: CCR's Performance before the Strategic Alliance in EUR (1999-2001) 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 
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EXHIBIT 11 – HIGHWAY NETWORK IN PORTUGAL (1985-2013) 
 
Exhibit 11: Highway Network in Portugal (1985-2013) 
Source: IMTT, 2015; "Relatório de Monitorização da Rede Rodoviária Nacional 2012-2013" 
available [online] at: 
http://www.imtt.pt/sites/IMTT/Portugues/InfraestruturasRodoviarias/RedeRodoviaria/Relatrio
s/Relatorio_Monitorizacao_RRN_2012-2013.pdf [accessed on 21 April 2015] 
EXHIBIT 12 – ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE OF GDP - PORTUGAL (1997-2010) 
 
Exhibit 12: Annual Percentage Growth Rate of GDP - Portugal (1997-2010) 
Source: World Bank, 2015 available [online] at: 
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EXHIBIT 13 –INFLATION RATE IN PORTUGAL (1997-2013) 
 
Exhibit 13: Inflation Rate in Portugal (1997-2013) 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 
EXHIBIT 14 – ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE OF GDP - BRAZIL (1997-2010) 
  
Exhibit 14: Annual Percentage Growth Rate of GDP - Brazil (1997-2010) 
Source: World Bank, 2015 available [online] at: 
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EXHIBIT 15 – INFLATION RATE IN BRAZIL (1997-2013) 
 
Exhibit 15: Inflation Rate in Brazil (1997-2013) 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 
EXHIBIT 16 – BRISA’S COUNTRY SELECTION FACTORS 
 
Exhibit 16: Brisa's Country Selection Factors 
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EXHIBIT 17 – INVESTMENT CRITERIA IN CCR 
 
Exhibit 17: Investment Criteria in CCR 
Source: Brisa’s Internal Documentation, 2010 
EXHIBIT 18 – BRISA’S INVESTMENT IN CCR (2001-2010) 










0.0 0.0 1.6 8.0 19.0 23.4 35.1 40.5 41.2 41.0 209.8 
Exhibit 18: Brisa’s Investment in CCR (2001-2010) 
Source: Brisa’s Internal Documentation, 2010 
Country Risk Investing in risk-acceptable countries with perspectives of 
governance, i.e. strong economic growth and decreasing risk profile
Partners Strong local partners where Brisa's competences and experience 
adds value to the asset
% of Equity Partnerships where Brisa will be as large as the largest, with joint 
control and playing the role of the industry partner
Investment Under €200M for a given market
Cash-Flow 
Generation
Perspectives of short-to-medium term cash-flow generation and 
cash-in option
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EXHIBIT 19 – CCR’S SHARE PRICE EVOLUTION IN EUR (2002-2010) 
 
Exhibit 19: CCR’s Share Price Evolution in EUR (2002-2010) 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 52 
EXHIBIT 20 – CCR’S SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURE IN 2002 (YEAR-END) 
 
Exhibit 20: CCR’s Shareholder Structure in 2002 (Year-end) 
Source: CCR, 2015; “Annual Report 2002” available [online] at: 
http://ri.ccr.com.br/grupoccr/web/conteudo_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=47219 
[accessed on 27 April] 
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EXHIBIT 21 – BRISA’S SHARE PRICE EVOLUTION IN EUR (1997-2013) 
 
Exhibit 21: Brisa’s Share Price Evolution in EUR (1997-2013) 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 
EXHIBIT 22 – MAIN EVENTS AFFECTING BRISA SINCE 2001 
 
Exhibit 22: Main Events Affecting Brisa since 2001 
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EXHIBIT 23 – BRISA’S PERFORMANCE DURING THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE IN EUR 
(2002-2010) 
In Millions of 
EUR 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Market 
Capitalization 3 146,0 3 158,0 4 025,2 4 259,7 5 562,1 5 894,9 3 084,9 4 139,4 3 008,8 
- Cash & 
Equivalents 14,7 16,6 44,3 312,2 204,7 113,1 140,3 170,5 1 355,9 
+ Preferred & 
Other 4,8 5,2 7,7 12,3 26,5 64,8 31,2 31,7 -0,1 
+ Total Debt 2 295,4 2 214,4 2 276,2 2 381,1 2 569,0 3 320,7 3 814,1 3 514,7 3 554,8 
Enterprise Value 5 431,5 5 361,0 6 264,9 6 341,0 7 952,8 9 167,3 6 790,0 7 515,3 5 207,6 
Revenue, 
Comparable 487,1 534,6 559,1 560,2 585,9 646,5 686,0 676,9 673,7 
  Growth %, YoY 9,3 9,8 4,6 0,2 4,6 10,3 6,1 -1,3 -0,5 
Gross Profit -- 352,1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
  Margin % -- 65,9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
EBITDA 379,3 399,7 420,2 411,0 417,7 459,3 480,9 438,3 346,2 
  Margin % 77,9 74,8 75,2 73,4 71,3 71,0 70,1 64,7 51,4 
Net Inc, 
Comparable 213,1 151,7 183,6 297,8 167,1 259,4 151,8 161,0 146,8 
  Margin % 43,7 28,4 32,8 53,2 28,5 40,1 22,1 23,8 21,8 
EPS, Comparable 0,36 0,26 0,31 0,50 0,28 0,43 0,25 0,27 0,25 
  Growth %, YoY 0,6 -28,8 20,8 62,3 -44,3 55,1 -41,4 5,9 -8,6 
Exhibit 23: Brisa’s Performance during the Strategic Alliance in EUR (2002-2010) 
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EXHIBIT 24 – CCR’S PERFORMANCE DURING THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE IN EUR (2002-
2010) 
In Millions of 
EUR 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Market 
Capitalization 168,8 602,7 1 626,2 2 698,4 4 128,7 4 272,9 2 949,5 7 052,9 9 330,2 
- Cash & 
Equivalents 49,9 35,3 145,5 122,1 214,0 56,6 321,4 849,7 531,2 
+ Preferred & 
Other 2,6 2,6 2,5 5,9 4,6 7,5 7,8 22,2 14,3 
+ Total Debt 405,7 345,9 324,0 546,3 627,2 773,8 1 152,6 1 868,9 2 404,5 
Enterprise Value 527,2 915,9 1 807,2 3 128,5 4 546,5 4 997,5 3 788,5 8 094,4 11 217,8 
Revenue, 
Comparable 378,7 329,3 402,9 650,9 786,0 884,6 1 028,4 1 120,2 2 000,3 
  Growth %, YoY -9,3 -13,0 22,3 61,6 20,8 12,6 16,2 8,9 78,6 
Gross Profit 160,9 130,5 187,3 331,7 393,0 525,7 630,3 1 259,0 1 787,8 
  Margin % 42,5 39,6 46,5 51,0 50,0 59,4 61,3 112,4 89,4 
EBITDA 176,4 162,7 206,8 364,3 442,0 544,1 646,7 649,6 886,5 
  Margin % 46,6 49,4 51,3 56,0 56,2 61,5 62,9 58,0 44,3 
Net Inc, 
Comparable -45,2 52,9 72,4 166,7 200,5 219,4 268,4 230,1 288,5 
  Margin % -11,9 16,1 18,0 25,6 25,5 24,8 26,1 20,5 14,4 
EPS, Comparable -0,04 0,04 0,04 0,10 0,12 0,14 0,17 0,13 0,16 
  Growth %, YoY 53,2 -- 21,0 90,3 9,4 6,7 22,2 -18,8 6,4 
                 Exhibit 24: CCR’s Performance during the Strategic Alliance in EUR (2002-2010) 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal [accessed on 2 May 2015] 
EXHIBIT 25 – DETAILS OF THE CCR STAKE DISPOSAL 
 
Exhibit 25: Details of the CCR Stake Disposal 
Source: “Out of Brazil and into the unknown”, Exane BNP Paribas (2010) 
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EXHIBIT 26 – CASH FLOWS DURING THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE IN EUR (2001-2010) 
Cash Flow Amount 
Increase Shareholding Position (-) €183.2 M 
Derivatives Payment (-) €69.5 M 
Total Outflows €252.7 M 
Debt Repayment (+) €28.9 M 
Dividends (+) €209.8 M 
Sale of Equity Stake (+) €1,156 M 
Total Inflows €1,394.7 M 
 
 
Exhibit 26: Cash Flows during the Strategic Alliance in EUR (2001-2010) 
 










2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chash Flows during the Strategic Alliance in EUR, excluding 
the sale of the equity stake in CCR
Outflow Inflow
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EXHIBIT 27 – EQUITY IRR COMPUTATION BY BNP PARIBAS (ESTIMATE) 
 
Exhibit 27: Equity IRR Computation by BNP Paribas (Estimate) 
Source: “Out of Brazil and into the unknown”, Exane BNP Paribas (2010) 
EXHIBIT 28 – DIVIDENDS RECEIVED AND EXPECTED FROM CCR IN EUR AND 
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS (2003-2014E) 
 
 
CCR 2011 2012 2013 2014 
DPS 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 
#Shares CCR 1 765 587 200 1 765 587 200 1 765 587 200 1 765 587 200 
% Equity Brisa 17.90% 17.90% 17.90% 17.90% 
Expected Div  €  18,014,286.20   €  18,014,286.20   €  18,014,286.20   €  18,014,286.20  
Exhibit 28: Dividends Received and Expected from CCR in EUR and Underlying Assumptions (2003-2014E) 
Sources: 
 Brisa’s Internal Documentation, 2010 (Dividends Received and % Equity Brisa) 
 CCR, 2015; “Políticas de Dividendos e Históricos” (DPS and #Shares CCR), available 
[online] at: 
http://ri.ccr.com.br/grupoccr/web/conteudo_pt.asp?idioma=0&conta=28&tipo=47177 
[accessed on 21 May 2015] 
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EXHIBIT 29 – BRISA’S PERFORMANCE AFTER THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE IN EUR (2010-
2013) 
In Millions of EUR 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Market Capitalization 3 008,8 1 406,8 1 182,9 -- 
- Cash & Equivalents 1 355,9 969,2 844,2 301,2 
+ Preferred & Other -0,1 -172,5 14,2 14,7 
+ Total Debt 3 554,8 4 486,4 2 916,1 2 539,2 
Enterprise Value 5 207,6 4 751,5 3 269,1 -- 
Revenue, Comparable 673,7 670,2 590,8 -- 
Growth %, YoY -0,5 -0,5 -11,8 -- 
EBITDA 346,2 431,4 428,9 380,6 
Margin % 51,4 64,4 72,6 -- 
Net Inc, Comparable 146,8 -82,2 41,9 -- 
Margin % 21,8 -12,3 7,1 -- 
EPS, Comparable 0,25 -0,14 0,07 -- 
Growth %, YoY -8,6 -- -- -- 
Exhibit 29: Brisa’s Performance after the Strategic Alliance in EUR (2011-2013) 
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